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It is not merely a question of water supply and drains now, you
know. No - it is the whole of our social life that we have got to
purify and disinfect. Henrik Ibsen1
When solutions to the problems of human ecology are considered,
all roads seem to lead to the political arena. Paul Ehrlich et al.2
[Environmentalists] should lobby as hard for campaign reform as
they do for environmental issues. Since the movement will never be
able to match industry’s war chests, the only way to level the playing
field is . . . through campaign finance reform. Randy Hayes3
Between 1970 and 1990, the United States passed laws, created agencies, and
spent one trillion dollars in an ostensible effort to improve environmental quality.
Yet, despite some notable gains (e.g., less lead in children’s brains), and despite
the strenuous efforts of grass-roots and national organizations, ”the massive
national effort to restore the quality of the environment has failed.”4
Among the many reasons for this failure, two need to be touched upon here.
First, the great majority of environmental thinkers ignore concrete political re-
alities. Instead, they are caught up in debates about the significance of one
or another proximate cause of the environmental crisis (choice of production
technologies and materials, overpopulation, and aﬄuence), or of one or another
alleged ultimate cause (philosophical beliefs and practices; biological heritage;
our tendency to dominate and exploit the poor, racial minorities, and wom-
en). The environmental movement is thus bereft of a core practical philosophy
capable of guiding and sustaining its actions.5
Second, while most environmental writers ignore brass-tacks political realities,
environmental activists often misconstrue them:
Although people who see the answer in political activism may be
noble champions of the democratic ideal, they do not seem to ap-
preciate what they are up against. Special interests are bound to be
victorious over the common interest in the long run. The prospect
of the ecological interest somehow prevailing over the commercial,
financial, and manufacturing interests whose money pays the media
pipers and finances the electoral process is therefore remote, to say
the least. . . . Environmental politicking within the system can
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only be a rear-guard holding action designed to slow the pace of
ecological retreat.6
This essay documents the built-in anti-ecological bias of American policies,
traces this bias to one of its roots, and argues that environmentalists should
direct their attention to the extirpation of this single root, not - as they do now
- to the inherently futile struggle against its numberless surface manifestations.
The Misbehavior of Organizations
We may begin with a simple extrapolation of the Lloyd/Hardin7 ”tragedy of
the commons” metaphor: When forced to choose between a course of action
which benefits their short-term interests but harms society, and a course of
action which benefits society but harms their short-term interests, and when
free to make this choice on their own, organizations tend to choose actions that
benefit them and harm society.8 When such harmful actions come under attack,
organizations tend to defend them, ”as if endowed with the instincts of living
beings.”9 On this view, a civilization can be judged, in part, by its record of
taming organizational misbehavior.
The nature and consequences of organizational misbehavior can be best grasped
through a few, randomly chosen, case histories and reflections:
I.In 1906, more than 10 percent of milk samples in New York City contained
live tuberculosis-causing bacteria. Though it was well known by then that
these bacteria could be killed by pasteurization (heating the milk), the dairy
industry’s spokesmen and scientists put up the usual fight. Among other things,
they claimed that pasteurization would destroy the value of milk and price it
off the market. Blessedly (albeit too late for the many additional victims), they
and the pathogens lost the fight.10
II.By the early 1930s, at the latest, the Manville Corporation (the world’s
largest asbestos manufacturer) knew that prolonged exposure to asbestos was
potentially lethal, but withheld that information from the government, the pub-
lic, and its own workers. Manville challenged unfavorable research findings by
sponsoring more congenial, albeit less objective, ”research.” It dismissed trou-
blesome British findings by disingenuously alleging that they did not apply to
the United States and by giving them the silent treatment in the industry’s trade
journal. With straight faces, Manville’s scientists and lawyers argued for years
and years that the problem was not with asbestos, but with the ”individual
susceptibilities” of asbestos workers.11
After the publication of the 1955 study establishing a link between
asbestos and lung cancer, the industry took the offensive, hiring nu-
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merous researches to ”prove” that asbestos was harmless. By 1960,
sixty-three scientific papers had been published on the problems of
asbestos exposure. The eleven studies funded by the asbestos in-
dustry all rejected the connection between asbestos and lung cancer
and minimized the dangers of asbestosis. All fifty-two independent
studies, on the other hand, found asbestos to pose a major threat
to human health. Such evidence suggests that the asbestos industry
knowingly perpetrated a massive fraud on its workers and on the
public.12
In the United States alone, asbestos-related diseases may claim the lives of 2.5
million exposed to asbestos dust on the job.13 Yet, even now, the governments
of Canada and Quebec continue to lobby abroad for the unimpeded exports of
Canadian asbestos.14
III.As in any other struggle to clean up the environment, the attitudes of the
various corporations to non-leaded petrol differed according to how they felt it
would affect their products, rather than on the intrinsic merits of the case.15
IV.In 1970, the Ford Motor Company introduced the Pinto — a small car in-
tended to compete with popular foreign imports. Ford did so even though secret
pre-production crash tests unequivocally showed that rear-end collisions would
readily rupture the Pinto’s gas tank and turn the Pinto into a firetrap. ”For
more than eight years afterwards, Ford successfully lobbied, with extraordinary
vigor and some blatant lies, against a key government safety standard that
would have forced the company to change the Pinto’s fire-prone gas tank.”16
During that period, some 700 people died and thousands more were disfigured.
Ford’s conduct had nothing to do with public-spiritedness and everything’s to
do with short-term interest: The cost of retooling Pinto assembly lines and of
equipping each car with a $5.08 safety gadget, company accountants calculated,
was greater than paying out millions to victims and their families. ”The bottom
line ruled, and inflammable Pintos kept rolling out of the factories.”17 In 1978 a
judge presiding over a Pinto-related tragedy concluded that ”Ford’s institutional
mentality was shown to be one of callous indifference to pubic safety.”18
V. In 1989, the late militant environmentalist Judi Bari, a friend, and their
children were run off the road by a log truck they had blockaded the day be-
fore. The FBI was uninterested in pressing charges against their assailant. But
when, in 1990, a bomb exploded under the seat of Judi’s car, shattering her
pelvis, dislocating her spine, and injuring fellow activist and co-passenger Daryl
Cherney, the FBI was unremittingly interested — in filing charges against the
victims and in risking Judi’s life by moving her from the hospital’s intensive care
unit to its jail ward. A private investigator working on the case concluded that
the bomber remained at large because the FBI tried ”to nail Judi and Daryl”
instead of following real leads.20
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VI. Here is a 1981 summary of the smoking/cancer ”controversy” by a respected
British cancer researcher:
There can never be, really, clearer proof than we now have with
tobacco. Yet the industry concerned will not accept in public that it
is causing these deaths. I think that this will be true of many other
industries which are found to cause deaths. . . . when an industry is
found to cause substantial numbers of deaths, with a few exceptions
. . . there will be deliberate attempts to mislead government and
the public as to what the evidence is. Even if certain individuals in
such industries want to be humane and want to work in some kind
of way towards the general good, and they are effective at doing so,
then they will find themselves rendered impotent or fired, because it
is not in the commercial interests of an industry to have its products
advertised as causing this, that, and the other kind of disease.21
VII.A former Deputy Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency:
Left alone, our government will not always look after the public in-
terest. In the environmental area there is a natural, built-in imbal-
ance. Private industry, driven by its own profit incentives to exploit
and pollute our natural resources, uses its inherent advantages to
exert political pressure to resist environmental requirements. The
machinations of industry explain at least in part why the abuses of
pollution became so severe before steps were taken to establish con-
trols. It was not until conditions approached a point of horror that
the public woke up to the need for reform.22
VIII.
When I was California’s secretary for resources . . . I called my
first hearing, on a toxic agricultural chemical. I called the hearing
because the scientists in the resources agency brought in research
from universities and elsewhere confirming our suspicions that this
substance was detrimental to health when applied to food products.
The chemical companies that produced the chemical brought their
own scientists to the hearing, who began pecking away at our data,
focusing on minutiae and quibbling over irrelevant details. In the
end, even though we were certain of our data, they raised enough
doubt that the legislative committee would not make the recom-
mended changes. This is standard practice in the United States.
Nearly every decision we made in the resources agency resulted in a
lawsuit, based on ”scientific” challenges to our information.23
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IX.The first clarion calls about Earth’s ozone layer were sounded in 1974. By
the mid-1980s, recurring 50 percent seasonal depletions over Antarctica were re-
ported. Though the causes of these depletions were uncertain, the chief suspects
were CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons), a group of human made chemicals. Moreover,
these same CFCs also accounted for some 24
that there was no reason for synthesizing any of these chemicals,
because nearly everything done by the CFCs and their [harmful]
suggested synthetic replacements can be done very nearly as effec-
tively by naturally occurring substances that do no ozone damage
at all - by water, for instance, or by such inert gases (in such ap-
plications as refrigeration and air-conditioning) as helium or carbon
dioxide. What they also knew, though, was that . . . the trou-
ble with replacing CFCs with, say, water - from the point of view
of the chemical industry - is that they can’t sell water; and their
voices in the ears of government were far louder than those of the
environmentalists.25
X. It’s important to note that organizational misconduct pervades every aspect
of politics, not just environmental politics. Here we only cite two instances:
The M-16 rifle had been a brilliant technical success in its early mod-
els, but was perverted by bureaucratic pressures into a weapon that
betrayed its users in Vietnam. . . . Between 1965 and 1969, more
than one million American soldiers served in combat in Vietnam. . .
. During those years, in which more than 40,000 American soldiers
were killed by hostile fire and more than 250,000 wounded, American
troops in Vietnam were equipped with a rifle their superiors knew
would fail when put to the test. . . . The original version of the
M-16 . . . was the most reliable, and the most lethal, infantry rifle
ever invented. But within months of its introduction in combat, it
was known among soldiers as a weapon that might jam and misfire,
and could pose as great a danger to them as to their enemy. These
problems, which loomed so large on the battlefield, were entirely
the results of modifications made to the rifle’s original design by the
Army’s own ordnance bureaucracy. The Army’s modifications had
very little to do with observation of warfare, but quite a lot to do
with settling organizational scores.26
Through seven years of fruitless toil to reach a bipartisan agreement on campaign
finance reform, one lesson was taught over and over and over: Everyone protects
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his or her own interest. PAC managers espouse the virtues of collective, disclosed
giving as a sign of healthy political involvement. Party officials, despite verbiage
to the contrary, prefer the status quo of evading the spirit or letter of the law.
Elected officials individually work to produce 535 potential reform bills that will
ensure collective stalemate.27
XI. Although this essay focuses on American politics, the tension between orga-
nizational interests and the common good have existed everywhere and always.
A former high-ranking Yugoslav official explained past collectivizations of peas-
ant holdings in communist countries:
The fact that the seizure of property from other classes, especially
from small owners, led to decreases in production and to chaos in the
economy was of no consequence to the new class [Communist Party].
. . . The class profited from the new property it had acquired even
though the nation lost thereby.28
XII.
What does the Dalkon Shield catastrophe teach us? Not that the
A. H. Robins Company was a renegade in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry. Yes, Robins - knowingly and willfully - put corporate greed
before human welfare, suppressed scientific studies that would as-
certain safety and effectiveness, concealed hazards from consumer-
s, the medical profession, and government, assigned a lower value
to foreign lives than to American lives, behaved ruthlessly towards
victims who sued, and hired outside experts who would give accom-
modating testimony. Yet almost every other major drug company
has done one or more of these things, and some have done them
repeatedly or routinely, and continue to do so. Some have even
been criminally persecuted and convicted, and are recidivists. Nor
does the Shield catastrophe teach us that the pharmaceutical indus-
try is unique. Cigarette companies profit from smoking, the single
greatest cause of preventable disease and death. Knowingly and
willfully, automobile manufacturers have sold cars that would be-
come rolling incinerators in rear-end collisions; chemical companies
have sold abroad carcinogenic pesticides that are banned here; mak-
ers of infant formula have, in impoverished Third World countries,
deprived babies of breast milk, the nearly perfect food; assorted in-
dustries have dumped poisonous wastes in the environment; coal
companies have falsified records showing the exposure of miners to
the particles that cause Black Lung; military contractors have sup-
plied defective weapons to the armed services.29
Our random sampler of case histories and reflections documents the ubiquity and
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decisive importance of organizational misconduct. It supports the conception
”of a large organization as a real acting unit because the people within it can be
replaced, and because the positions they occupy constrain their thoughts and
actions.”30 It shows that corporate misconduct follows a pattern.31 It supports
the claim of asymmetry in American society between faceless organizations and
individuals. We have here a situation in which ”two parties beginning with
nominally equal rights in a relation, but coming to it with vastly different re-
sources, end with very different actual rights in the relation.”32 This sampler
suggests that organizational malfeasance pays. Because punishment of organi-
zational misconduct is relatively rare, and because the financial penalties that
are levied often fail to equal ”the gains from corporate violations of the law,”
corporations ”can usually treat both criminal penalties and civil fines as merely
a cost of doing business.”33 This and similar samplers tell us much about life
in these United States:
The repeated examples of respected men and women using the most
unscrupulous means to enlarge already ample fortunes, of major cor-
porations’ indifference to the injuries and deaths they cause innocent
people, of the government’s violations of human rights, and of the
weakness and corruption of the enforcement effort, certainly cast our
society in a dark light.34
The implications of organizational misconduct to the future of humanity are
profound. True, such misconduct exerted decisive influence over human affairs
long before 1997. It is also true that human beings have been annihilating species
and degrading ecosystems for millennia.35 But even if we put ethics aside, past
wrongs do not, by any stretch of the imagination, justify complacency: our
ancestors could plead ignorance and comparative inconsequentiality; we can’t.
These case studies and reflections tell us why the human predicament ”is much
more serious” in 1997 than it was in 1970.36 They tell us why we persist in doing
too little too late when it comes to pollution, overpopulation, and conspicuous
consumption.
For committed democrats,37 these examples raise a grave question: How do
organizations manage to convince us that their interests should override ours,
our descendants’, and nature’s? The answer no doubt has something to do with
our worldview,38 social realities, our nature,39 our sources of information,40 and
the character of our elections.41 For practical reasons, though, here I shall only
touch upon the frailest - and perhaps most important - root of environmental
neglect.
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Money and Environmental Politics
The intimate link between private money and national policies is well-known.
”To get elected these days, what matters most is not sound judgment or per-
sonal integrity or a passion for justice. What matters most is money. Lots of
money.”42 This observation is backed up by a considerable amount of research.
For instance, in one study money emerged ”as the first and most essential ele-
ment in political party activity and effectiveness in the 1980s.”43 Another study
shows that ”campaign spending has a significant effect on the outcomes of con-
gressional elections.”44
Common sense suggests that political donations are worthwhile investments.
Indeed, studies show a ”disturbing correlation between . . . campaign contri-
butions and how members of Congress . . . vote on bills important to special
interest groups.”45 A former counsel for President Carter says: ”It’s one step
away from bribery. PACs contribute because they count on you to vote with
them.”46
Apart from ”the exceptionally wealthy,” says chief Washington correspondent
of a major daily, ”raising political money has become a throbbing headache
that drains vital time and energy from the job of governing. This chore leaves
many members part-time legislators and full-time fund-raisers.”47 Naturally,
organizations which benefit from environmental neglect enrich the campaign
coffers of politicians who are willing to tolerate it. One member of Congress
quipped once that ”business already owns one party and now it has a lease,
with option to buy, on the other.”48
Over the years we have gotten used to occasional outbursts on this issue, not
only from reformers but from frustrated or about-to-be-retired members of the
power elite. Two ”old-line conservatives” who, by 1986, ”have been senators
a combined total of 68 years:” ”It is not ’we the people’ but political-action
committees and moneyed interests who are setting the nation’s political agenda
and are influencing the position of candidates on the important issues of the
day,” said one senator. ”We are gradually moving elections away from the
people,” said the other, ”as certainly as night follows day.”49
The ”terrible pressures” a politician faces in our system, said a John F. Kennedy’s
ghostwriter, ”discourage acts of political courage” and often drive him to ”a-
bandon or subdue his conscience.”50 ”Searching for campaign money,” said a
former U.S. Vice President, ”is a disgusting, degrading, demeaning experience.
It is about time we cleaned it up.”51 A U.S. Senator: ”When special interests
control the financing for campaigns, Congress is very unlikely to act in the na-
tional interest.”52 ”Everybody knows the problems of campaign money today,”
says President Clinton, ”there’s too much of it, it takes too much time to raise,
and it raises too many questions.”53 In 1987, a Senate majority leader appealed
to his colleagues:
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It is my strong belief that the great majority of senators - of both
parties - know that the current system of campaign financing is
damaging the Senate, hurts their ability to be the best senator for
this nation and for citizens of their respective States that they could
be, strains their family life by consuming even more time than their
official responsibilities demand, and destroys the democracy we all
cherish by eroding public confidence in its integrity. If we do not face
a problem of this magnitude and fix it, we have no one but ourselves
to blame for the tragic results.54
A mainstream journalist commented on a political scandal, a scandal which led
to an open hearing in the U.S. Senate. In this hearing,
The slimy underbelly of American politics slithered into full view,
[exposing] how U.S. senators grub for campaign funds from moneyed
interests seeking to buy influence. . . . It was the best lesson the
nation has yet had on the costs and the consequences of a campaign-
finance system that has corroded government at the highest levels.
Even if all five senators are cleared in the end, this trial-like proce-
dure is likely to evoke a public verdict that the system itself is guilty
of murder, with integrity the casualty. . . . [This scandal] is not dif-
ferent in kind from the defense industry interests that lavish money
on members of the armed services committees, the union political
action groups that funnel cash to the labor committee lawmaker, or
the Wall Street interest that fuel the campaigns of incumbents who
oversee securities-industry lawmaking. They are all threads in the
dark tapestry that now smothers our political system, like a smelly
blanket under which lawmakers lie in bed with those who would pro-
cure their favors for cash. There is a name for those who solicit such
attention, and it is not ”senator.”55
Six years later, another mainstream journalist wrote:
The government is being bought out from underneath us through
legal bribes called campaign contributions. The scandal of politics
is not what’s illegal - it’s what is legal.56
The sober reflections of two political scientists:
[The] political finance system . . . undermines the ideals and ham-
pers the performance of American democracy. . . . Officials . . . are
. . . captives of the present system. Their integrity and judgment
are menaced — and too often compromised - by the need to raise
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money and the means now available for doing it. . . . The pattern
of giving distorts American elections: candidates win access to the
electorate only if they can mobilize money from the upper classes,
established interest groups, big givers, or ideological zealots. Other
alternatives have difficulty getting heard. And the voters’ choice is
thereby limited. The pattern of giving also threatens the govern-
mental process: the contributions of big givers and interest groups
award them access to officeholders, so they can better plead their
causes. . . . The private financing system . . . distort[s] both elec-
tions and decision making. The equality of citizens on election day
is diluted by their inequality in campaign financing. The electorate
shares its control of officials with the financial constituency.57
Money, then, throws some light on our collective misbehavior. In particular,
it explains in part why the early promise of environmental cleanup remains
unfulfilled:
No matter how large, clever, and sophisticated in the ways of Wash-
ington the environmental movement has become, when it comes to
lobbying congress, it has remained a mosquito on the hindquarters
of the industrial elephant. Corporations finance a lobby that is will-
ing to spend almost unlimited time and money combating a process
- environmental regulation - they claim costs them $125 billion a
year. Chemical manufacturers, oil companies, big agriculture, tim-
ber interests, and their PACs will, unless campaign finance laws are
reformed, always have greater access to the legislature than environ-
mental lobbyists. . . . Studies of lobbies and PAC contributions
indicate that industry is pretty much willing to match the environ-
mental movement about 10 to 1 in dollars and lobbyists. In the 1991-
1992 congressional session, the Sierra Club contributed $680,000 to
congressional candidates nationwide, an enormous amount for an
environmental organization. The amount was dwarfed, however, by
the $21.3 million donated during the same session by the energy and
resource-extraction industries alone58
Concluding Remarks
Contemporary thinkers help us understand the environmental situation and
visualize sustainable futures. Yet, if they wish to see anything like their beautiful
dreams come true, they must solidly embed ugly political facts in their critiques
of contemporary America.
Similarly, the strategy of fighting directly against the environmental ill one
cares most about - despite its intuitive appeal, sporadic victories, and millions
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of well-meaning and dedicated practitioners - is counterproductive. In a political
system that institutionalizes bribes, the struggles of grass-roots and mainstream
environmentalists resemble wrestling matches in which one fighter must tie both
hands behind her back. Environmentalists should focus their scarce energies
and resources on, once and for all, untying one of their hands. Along with other
humanitarians, they must launch an all-out campaign whose single goal is this:
eradicating the scourge of private money from American politics.
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